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RESUMO/ABSTRACT 
 
 
Azorean Savings Banks and the 1929 Economic Crisis 
 
What sets the Azorean banking system apart in the Portuguese context is the 
concentration of Caixas Económicas or Saving Banks accounting for half of 
these financial institutions in Portugal.  These saving banks were promoted and 
had as shareholders mainly small and medium local traders and landlords with 
export business. This contrasts with the overwhelming concentration of big 
traders and traditional landlords as agents of international and national banks. 
These small institutions were the only network covering most of the islands and 
preceded the expansion of a national bank network of agencies created mostly 
after the Second World War 
This article examines the effects of the 1929 crisis on the Azorean banking 
system which was generalized, and had deep and long-lasting effects, using 
unpublished data taken from the archive of Banco de Portugal. It is a case of 
contagion, typical of a banking crisis, affecting the credibility and confidence of 
all the institutions and leading to an interruption of payments for a period of over 
two years. Bankruptcies are limited to Caixa Bancária Raposo do Amaral and 
Caixa Económica Socorros Mútuos but the restructuring spreads over a ten 
year period. The contraction of monetary circulation caused by the banking 
crisis and the elimination of escudo insulano are also major contributing factors 
to the long and deep economic crisis that spread from 1929 to 1945. The 
banking crisis together with the protectionism of European markets and 
Portuguese colonial policies lead to the reorientation of the agro-export model 
to mainland Portuguese markets.  
 
 
 
 
 
Fernando Lopes 
Universidade dos Açores 
Departamento de Economia e Gestão 
Rua da Mãe de Deus, 58 
9501-801 Ponta Delgada 
 
Fátima Sequeira Dias 
Universidade dos Açores 
Departamento de Economia e Gestão 
Rua da Mãe de Deus, 58 
9501-801 Ponta Delgada 
 
1 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Azorean Savings Banks and the 1929 Economic Crisis 
 
 
 
 
Fernando Lopes, flopes@uac.pt  
 Department of Economics and Management 
University of Azores 
 
and 
 
Fátima Sequeira Dias, mfdias@uac.pt 
 Department of Economics and Management 
University of Azores 
  
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
What sets the Azorean banking system apart in the Portuguese context is the 
concentration of Caixas Económicas or Saving Banks accounting for half of these 
financial institutions in Portugal.  These saving banks were promoted and had as 
shareholders mainly small and medium local traders and landlords with export business. 
This contrasts with the overwhelming concentration of big traders and traditional 
landlords as agents of international and national banks. These small institutions were the 
only network covering most of the islands and preceded the expansion of a national 
bank network of agencies created mostly after the Second World War 
This article examines the effects of the 1929 crisis on the Azorean banking 
system which was generalized, and had deep and long-lasting effects, using unpublished 
data taken from the archive of Banco de Portugal. It is a case of contagion, typical of a 
banking crisis, affecting the credibility and confidence of all the institutions and leading 
to an interruption of payments for a period of over two years. Bankruptcies are limited 
to Caixa Bancária Raposo do Amaral and Caixa Económica Socorros Mútuos but the 
restructuring spreads over a ten year period. The contraction of monetary circulation 
caused by the banking crisis and the elimination of escudo insulano are also major 
contributing factors to the long and deep economic crisis that spread from 1929 to 1945. 
The banking crisis together with the protectionism of European markets and Portuguese 
colonial policies lead to the reorientation of the agro-export model to mainland 
Portuguese markets.  
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1. The 1929 crisis in the Portuguese economic literature 
 
The 1890 crisis, the British ultimatum crisis, along with the bankruptcy of the 
Portuguese state, has in Portuguese literature the mythical significance of being the 
mother of all crises as it is related with the very survival and national independence of 
Portugal.  
This symbolic charge relates, in an international context, with the 1929 crisis 
due to its extreme disruption of the economy in the three main industrialized countries, 
United States of America, United Kingdom and Germany- and to the high level of 
unemployment that followed.  Unemployment in 1932 reached 23.5% in the USA, and 
the indices of industrial production fell to 53 with the 100 value attributed to 19291.   
The crisis affects differently the countries where primary sector activities are 
dominant, according to Keynes2, as “the mining and agriculture products are being sold 
at prices that do not cover costs”. The second characteristic of the crisis in these 
countries is “that the time gap between interruption of production and the highest level 
of unemployment is larger than in the industry”. In the agriculture sector the production 
cycle is longer, production  units smaller, costs of temporary shutdown bigger and 
unemployment less visible as farmers maintain activity accepting losses in income .The 
financial problems of interrupting activity are according to Keynes greater in countries 
were agriculture and mining are the main activities and sources of income.  
According to Rosas (1986) the great depression was felt late in Portugal, for a 
short period and with a smaller impact than in other European countries3. This thesis is 
also shared by Nunes, Bastien and Valério (1994)4, while recognizing that the 
Portuguese economy did not avoid the effects of the crisis it did “avoid a reduction in 
the level of economic activity and the average income, due in part to its nature still 
predominantly rural, to an eclectic and effective economic policy that attempted to 
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moderate consumption, encourage investment and sustain exports through competitive 
devaluation”. They stress the importance of the short term economic policy measures, 
which started in 1922 with the reform of the Portuguese tax system, reducing the public 
deficit and the indebtedness of the Portuguese state and continued into 1928 and 1929 
with the new tax reform and fiscal consolidation of the National Dictatorship. Mata 
(2002) identifies as main effects of the 1929 crisis the reduction in export and emigrant 
remittances.  The decrease of imports and the return of Portuguese capital allow even a 
temporary return to the gold standard and to peg the escudo to the British pound.  
Neves and Belo´s (2002)5 analysis of the cyclical behaviour of the Portuguese 
economy in the 1910-1958 period, using the long series for the Portuguese economy of 
Baptista and alii (1992), does not reveal a significant correlation with the European and 
United States economies.  The lower statistical association of the cyclical components 
of the product and export series supports the hypothesis of Rosas (1986) that the 
closeness of the Portuguese economy acts as a protection against the external effects of 
the 1929 crisis. The association of a closed economy and lower development level with 
the preferential linkages to Brazil and the colonial empire are also identified as 
contributors to the minor impact of the Great Depression. 
After setting this general framework of the Great Depression in Portugal, as seen 
from the Portuguese economic literature, this article assesses its impact on the Azorean 
archipelago economy using the information on the banking crisis.  The scholarly benign 
view of the effects of the 1929 crisis is contrasted with bankruptcies and bank runs in a 
small peripheral economy. From 1850 onwards, the free trade economic environment 
and liberal banking laws created a favourable setting for the expansion of a modern 
Azorean banking system supporting an agricultural export oriented towards expansion 
as discussed in section 2 and 3 of this article. The change in the economic environment 
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in the 1920 is marked by the 1929 economic crisis and the 1930´s banking crisis 
discussed in section 4. A comparison of balance sheet items from 1910 to 1945 yields a 
more detailed insight of bank´s behaviour and its effects on the economy. Unpublished 
data taken from the archive of Banco de Portugal and the archives of present day banks 
are complemented with newspaper advertisements and reports from the first Azorean 
Congress in 19396. 
 
2. The economic structure of Azores at the beginning of the 20th century 
 
 
The flexibility of the Azorean economy and its agro export model has been a 
constant since early settlement. During the last centuries wheat is followed by pastel 
and corn and later on the orange cycle that lasts one hundred years (Dias, 2008)7.  
Orange exports are dominant from the second half of the 18th century to the last quarter 
of the 19th century, and is followed during the last period of the 19th century by several 
experiments with industrial cultures: sugar beet, sweet potato, tobacco, chicory, tea. The 
orange export business contributed to the accumulation of capital later on invested in 
new agro-industry projects. The economic restructuring would once again be based on 
the traditional agro-export model; however, contrary to what happened in the past, the 
gentlemen farmers would now diversify their investments.  
In the beginning of the 20th century the agro-export model did not have a 
dominant commodity but was based on a more diversified base: pineapples, espadana, 
tea, sugar and alcohol produced from sugar beet and sweet potato, respectively. Sugar 
beet becomes the main industrial culture, in area cultivated and income generated. 
Between the two world wars the archipelago was self sufficient in sugar, exporting 
small quantities to the mainland. Sugar from sugar beet and alcohol was produced at 
very competitive prices in the Azores but the expansion of the local agro-industry was 
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limited by a policy of exporting quotas to the mainland market to defend colonial sugar 
and preserve the income generated from high tariffs applied to foreign products. The 
same policy was applied to all the main agro-industrial Azorean products, tobacco and 
tea. The income from sugar beet declined after the First World War and these 
agriculture cultures were substituted slowly by cattle production.  
As Casaca (1985) refers in the interwar period the export of livestock products 
will become dominant: “The agro-industrial export model failure (the pineapple of São 
Miguel has never recovered the markets lost during the first war), contrary to 
continental interests (for alcohol) or colonial (case of sugar, tea, belfry, chicory).” The 
growing relevance of meat and milk in the model of urban consumption, the 
advancement of  manufacturing and storage techniques for dairy products, the structure 
and size of the property of the Azores, and the clear complementarities of the Azores 
and the Portuguese mainland  explain this transformation, which will be particularly 
sensitive on the island of S. Miguel. Live cattle exports to the Lisbon market reach 
20.148 cattle heads in the 1935 to 1937 period, while other export commodities are as 
follows: tea 102 tonnes, sugar 399 tonnes, alcohol 454 thousand litres. The dairy 
industry begins as an artisanal offshoot of cattle farming early in the century but evolves 
from a group of 51 dairy processors in 1928 to 31 in 1929, 23 in 1936 and just 3 in 
1947, of which two with capital from the mainland, according to Faria e Maia (1947-
1948)8.  The same author refers that in 1945 butter and cheese exports to the mainland 
had a market share of 34% and 43% respectively. Live cattle exports had a market share 
of 22% in the Lisbon market9. 
In the first half of the 20th century a diversified export portfolio of pineapple, 
sperm whale oil, live cattle, butter, cheese, alcohol and espadana completed the main 
productions for local consumption, corn, wheat, broad beans, wine etc. A structural 
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change in the Azorean economy took place at the beginning of the 20th century. First 
there is a change in the export markets for Azorean commodities.  A slow and 
continuous decline of the United Kingdom and German market share and a growing but 
steadily shift towards the mainland market. The agro-export model supported by a free 
trade environment moves towards a more inward looking and less specialized economy. 
The two world wars, the closing of the emigration to the United States, the strong 
protectionism of European markets and the policy protection for mainland and colonial 
productions contributed to the isolation and steady decline of the Azorean economy and 
the inward character of the society.   
        
3. Azorean Saving Banks (1850-1945) 
 
The contribution of the gentlemen farmers, during the 19th century, is identified 
by Miranda (1989)10 as a major entrepreneurial source to the development and 
modernization of the Azorean economy. The income generated in the orange export 
business was reinvested in several agro-industrial projects later on, and financed the 
building of the main harbour in the Azores during the 19th  century - Ponta Delgada.  
The wealth of these gentlemen farmers derived from the agribusiness and export 
activities contributing to the dominance of the main agrarian ideal and was preserved 
well into the 20Th century in the traditional agro-export model.  
Credit to fund this operation was provided by local gentlemen farmers with links 
to some important  commercial banking houses in the United Kingdom as well as some 
local traders, as Dias (2007)11 illustrates in the commercial and financial relationships 
between George Hayes, Salomão Bensaude, Clemente Joaquim da Costa , João Melo 
Abreu with William Mc Andrew & Sons. Later on the transfers from Brazil and United 
States emigrants will also feed into the regional saving banks but in the second half of 
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the 19th century the export of agricultural products was managed by these export-import 
houses which provided transport and insurance and managed the flow of commercial 
bills. 
In the transition from the eighteen hundreds to the nineteen hundreds alongside 
the new banking institutions survive several traders cum local bankers. The insular 
newspapers provide several examples of adverts by local traders which lend money, 
discount commercial paper, act as pawn brokers and simultaneously   are local agents 
for national and foreign banks and insurance companies. According to Sousa (2002)12, 
an important group of national and international commercial banks, existing since the 
end of 19th century, managed their business  through their agents in Ponta Delgada and 
Angra do Heroismo , namely: Banco Lusitano, Banco do Minho, Banco Comercial do 
Porto e Lisboa, Banco Lisboa e Açores, Banco Aliança, Lloyds, Credit Lyonais, Cheque 
Bank, Thos. Cook & Son, J.T. Morgan e Cº, Knauth, Nachod & Khune of New York, 
Drexel & cº of Philadelfia, Banco Nacional Ultramarino, Banco União, Cia Geral de 
Crédito Predial.  The branches of international and national banks were represented by 
wealthy businessman, well established in the Azorean commerce, Bensaude e Cº, João 
Melo Abreu, George W. Hayes in Ponta Delgada and Aniceto António dos Santos, 
Manuel Gonçalves Fagundes, Visconde de Bruges amongst others in Angra do 
Heroísmo.  
 This type of businessman survives well into the 1900s as the case of Melo 
Abreu most notoriously illustrates, who besides accumulating business interests in the 
beer industry, was an agent of a national bank and a member of the board of Caixa 
Económica dos Socorros Mútuos.  As a sign of archaism there was little specialization, 
the industrial was a trader as well as a banker as Braudel refers for the sixteen and 
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seventeen hundreds. The new banks and saving institutions brought with them 
modernity and professionalism to the financial activity. 
National banks as Banco de Portugal were also present from 1892 in Ponta 
Delgada, 1894 in Horta, and 1895 in Angra, integrating the Azorean economy in a 
national network, and from 1887 were already managing the issue of local currency, 
escudos insulanos. Caixa Geral de Depósitos created in 1876 and merged in 1885 with 
Caixa Económica Portuguesa was also present at the end of the 19Th century. Little is 
known about the impact of their operations in the Azores, as Silveira e Sousa (2002) 
asserts. Both institutions centralized the bank operations of the Portuguese 
administration while practicing commercial operations. 
What sets the Azorean banking system apart in the Portuguese context is the 
concentration of Caixas Económicas or Saving Banks accounting for half of these 
financial institutions in Portugal. The first Azorean Caixa Económica (1845) was 
founded in Angra do Heroismo one year after the creation of Caixa Económica do 
Montepio Geral and follows the publication of a Bill of Law which contracts with 
Companhia Confiança Nacional the establishment of a network of Caixas Económicas. 
All of them, except Caixa Económica de Angra and Montepio Geral, collapse in the 
1846-47 banking crisis, according to Valério (2006)13. The second groups of modern 
Azorean saving institutions founded were Caixa Económica Faialense, created in 1862 
and linked to the Masonic association Sociedade Amor da Pátria (1859), Caixa 
Económica da Associação de Socorros Mútuos, founded in 1869, and Caixa Económica 
do Montepio Terceirense, founded in 1880 and associated with Sociedade Auxiliadora 
das Classes Laborais da Terceira. Soon after, several savings banks were founded, 
almost always connected to the Misericórdias (charitable organisations), together with 
an insurance company with Azorean capital, Companhia Açoriana de Seguros, and with 
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no connection to national or international banks. With the dawn of the 20th century, a 
few other financial institutions appeared on almost every island, all of them having as 
their corporate purpose the financing of agricultural production, the management of the 
modest workers’ savings and the assistance to those who could afford credit.  
Relying on the volume of assets and of deposits as indicators of size, one must 
stress the importance of Caixa Económica do Montepio Terceirense as the biggest 
saving bank, followed by Banco Micaelense and Caixa de Crédito Micaelense. This 
model, a savings institution associated with an insurance cooperative, mutualista, is 
common in the 19th century. In 1905 Montepio Terceirense had already established a 
network of six agencies in six islands (Ponta Delgada, Vila Franca do Campo, Praia da 
Graciosa, Velas, Horta and S.Roque do Pico). The Caixa de Crédito Micaelense evolves 
from an earlier savings institution the Grémio founded in 1907 by a large group of small 
shareholders most of them local businessmen and some landlords, amongst them we 
find the Viscount of Porto Formoso.  Albano de Azevedo, a small shareholder, is 
referred to the manager and in time becomes the main shareholder. 
 A second group of saving institutions linked to Misericórdias (charitable 
institutions) was created: Caixa Económica da Misericórdia de Angra (1893), Caixa 
Económica da Misericórdia de Ponta Delgada (1925), Caixa Económica da Santa Casa 
da Misericórdia da Povoação (1932). Most of them are modest with a small economic 
impact but socially relevant and survive until the end of the 20th century. 
Only two banking houses, in a total of 45 were created in the Azores according 
to Valério (2002)14. One was Frazão Pacheco & Comandita, and the biggest Casa 
Bancária Raposo do Amaral, founded by José and Nicolau Raposo de Amaral in 1917 
and having as main shareholders the Raposo de Amaral family. Two regional banks 
were created: Banco Micaelense in 1912 and Banco do Faial in 1922. Banco do Faial, 
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originally with a capital of 1.2 million escudos insulanos raised it to 3 million   in the 
following year, to become the third biggest Azorean banking institution was a very 
successful but short lived bank. Banco Micaelense begins its activities in 1912, with an 
initial capital of 230 thousand escudos insulanos raised from a large group of local 
landlords and businessmen; it’s the longest living Azorean bank. 
The new saving banks were promoted and had as shareholders mainly small and 
medium local traders and landlords with export business in contrast with the 
overwhelming concentration of big traders and traditional landlords as agents of 
international and national banks. These small institutions were the only network 
covering most of the islands and preceded the expansion of a national bank network of 
agencies created mostly after the Second World War. The model of Caixa Económica as 
saving institution associated either with Mutualistas or Misericórdias was dominant as 
its initial capital requirements were smaller. As Lains (1995) and Sousa (2002)15 refer, 
Caixa Económica did not have a fund of capital requiring a return and they were mostly 
focused on building a portfolio of deposits. In the Azores emigrant remittances first 
from Brazil, after the 1870´s, and later on from the USA were an important resource 
contributing to the expansion of this saving institutions. 
At the end of the First World War there were 14 saving institutions, mostly 
Caixas Económicas and two banks which provide the information for the following 
analyses of the effects of the 1929 crisis. A dataset of balance sheet assets and liabilities 
for this sample of Azorean Banks has been assembled for the period from 1910 to 1945. 
Unpublished data have been taken from the archives of present day banks and the 
archive of Banco de Portugal. 
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4.  The 1929 crisis and bankruptcy in the saving banks. 
 
The 1929 crisis affected the Portuguese banking system causing, according to 
Nunes, Bastien and Valério (1994) and Telo (1994),16 the bankruptcy of two currency 
issuing banks is the North of Portugal, the Bank of Minho and Commercial Bank of 
Porto, but not generating a widespread run on bank deposits. Valério et al. (2006)17 refer 
to the 1929-1931 years as a period of difficulty for the banks but do not classify it as a 
banking crisis.  Bank distress in 1876 and in 1891 is rightly classified as a banking crisis 
but this does not apply to the 1929-1931 events because it did not affect “the five major 
banks or generate a generalized panic”. 
 
 
  In the Azores, the crisis affects the majority of banks leading to the closure of 
some in 1934 and 1935. The 1926 earthquake and the 1929 crisis undermine the 
economy of the district of Horta. As early as 1929, the Caixa Económica Faialense in its 
annual report refers to the effects of the crisis "that caused much suffering (...) since the 
time that the earth was shaken to its foundations" and again in 1932 to its effects on the 
Horta district economy and lending activities. According to the 1935 report of the Caixa 
Económica Picoense the year was of "great embarrassment" and distrust leading to 
withdrawal of deposits resulting from lack of confidence in the savings banks. In 1935 
this leads to interruption of payments and the temporary closure of Banco do Faial. 
As for the district of Angra Heroismo, the situation, reported in Proceedings of 
the First Congress Açoriano conducted in 1938, was deplorable. “In 1932 the saving 
deposits in the four Caixas Económicas amounted to sixty million escudos (...). This 
larger sum was the result of the flow of emigrant gold remittances from North America 
and Brazil which have stopped and even reversed. This together with very high taxes 
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affected the economic equilibrium and accentuated the impact of the crisis” (1939, 
474)18 
The Fiscal Supervisory Board of Caixa de Crédito Micaelense, in the March 20 
1931 meeting, asked Banco de Portugal “to prevent a difficult but foreseeable situation 
where it would be necessary to obtain numeraire through loan or discount on the values 
we have, because any of these operations are completely unfeaseble now, given that 
neither the Bank of Portugal nor the Caixa Geral de Depósitos are able to intervene 
without proper superior authorization”. This difficult but foreseeable situation became 
reality, according to Crédito Micaelense 1934 annual report analysis. A request for a 
rescue operation by Casa Bancária Raposo do Amaral then in serious financial 
difficulties was discussed. The acquisition proposal was rejected by unanimity by all 
shareholders due to the government and the central bank decision of not to intervene in 
other financial institutions, Banco Micaelense and Caixa Económica da Associação de 
Socorro Mútuos de Ponta Delgada.  
The interruption of payments and a generalized bank closure at the end of 1934 
are referred in several annual reports as “a great catastrophe and a big blow to public 
confidence” with large impact in the local economy. The situation described in the 
annual reports of Azorean banks and in the local press is substantially different from 
that described for Portugal by Nunes, Bastien and Valério (1994) setting a widespread 
crisis of confidence in the system that is fought only by the temporary suspension of 
payments for most banks and permanent closure of the Casa Bancária Raposo do 
Amaral and Caixa Económica da Associação de Socorros Mútuos of Ponta Delgada. 
Calomiris and Mason (2003) identify this type of bank failures and deposit contraction 
as a banking crisis when referring to the 1929-31 banking crisis in the United States19.  
14 
 
Furthermore this is also a case of local contagion typical of a banking crisis and 
covering most of the institutions regardless of their soundness. Milton Friedman and 
Anna J. Schwartz (1963)20 advocate that bank panics and loss of confidence or “fear” 
are a primary cause of the 1931 banking crisis in the USA and sources of shock to the 
real economy.  In the Azorean case a run on bank deposits is reported by Banco 
Micaelense on January 2nd, 1935. Banco do Faial suspends payments in April 1935. In 
Angra “there is also a temporary suspension of payments by the most important Caixa 
Económica” and the bankruptcy of an important commercial trader with a loss of 2.5 
million escudos as reported later in the 1st Azorean Congress.  The bankruptcy of Caixa 
Raposo do Amaral and Caixa Económica da Associação de Socorros Mútuos is finally 
declared and an administrator is nominated to organize a meeting of debtholders.  The 
bankruptcy process and the reorganization of debt led to the creation of Banco Agricola 
de S.Miguel as a successor to Caixa Bancária Raposo do Amaral in 1936 and the 
reconstitution of Banco Micaelense which only reopens in January 1937. Caixa 
Económica de Socorros Mútuos is the only bank that is not reorganized and 
reconstituted.  The fragility of the Azorean banking system to episodes of loss of 
confidence is the result of the difference between the liquidity of funds, mostly deposits, 
and investments in property investment and agro-industrial activities weakened by the 
crisis of 1929 or by episodes of fraud. 
The analysis of annual reports data provides us with a more detailed view of this 
banking crisis.  The period under consideration begins with the introduction of escudo 
in 1910 and ends in 1945. It is a rich and eventful period including the monetary 
reforms of   escudo insulano and monetary integration with the elimination of the 
Azorean currency. In the banking system it encompasses the creation and expansion of a 
network of regional banks as reported in section 3.   
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  The analysis is organized in the following sub periods:  
a) The Republic: 1910-1928; 
b) National Dictatorship and the Great Depression: 1929-1939; 
c)  World War II: 1940-45; 
From very small initial values of cash, current accounts and saving accounts, in the 
1910 to 1928 period, the data reveals a steady and robust growth with annual average 
rates of 163%, 168% and 138% respectively.  As illustrated in figures 1, 2 and 3 cash 
and deposits in other banks reach 25 million escudos, cash and current accounts 42 
million escudos and saving accounts 43 million escudos.  The growth in funds available 
in the regional bank system is a good indicator of monetary growth even without the 
data of currency in circulation outside the banking system either for transactions 
purposes or for private saving. These rates of growth are good indicators of the 
expansion of the banking system and its increased credibility.  
The data for the second period reveals a strong reduction of the funds available 
in the system and are a good indicator of a monetary contraction. The decrease in 
currency in circulation is shown in figure 2, with an abrupt decrease in the cash 
available and current deposits between 1931 and 1939.   A very clear description is done 
in the 1st Azorean Congress:  
«Devaluation of small and great rural property increases by the day, there is a 
shortage of currency in circulation in the Azores islands, barter is generalized and bread 
is used to pay wages» (1939, 467).  
The amount of cash available decreases from 24.8 million escudos in 1929 to 
10.8 million escudos at the end of the period, a reduction of 56% which is accompanied 
by the stagnation of current accounts which grow 5.8% from 19 million escudos to 20 
million escudos. Overall there is a 29% contraction of liquidity from an initial value of 
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44 million escudos to 31 million escudos.  This reduction in the monetary circulation is 
accompanied by a decline of 53%, from 47 million escudos to 22 million escudos, in 
saving deposited in banks and Caixas Económicas as illustrated in figure 3.  
The initial decrease in the value of saving deposits, in 1930, is followed by a 
small and temporary recuperation in 1931 and 1932, and a long and sustained 
contraction going as far as 1942.  A ten year period during which Azorean savings leave 
the banking system and take refuge in the private vaults or are sent abroad or feed 
circuits of informal lending is reported by a congressman from Terceira in a 
communication to the 1st Azorean Congress: 
“As of 31 December 1937 the sum of deposits in the four savings and loans 
banks was reduced to Esc. 33.428.500$00 – less than half of the amount reported five 
years ago. The money  either has migrated to the USA and Brazil  or entered the private 
lending circuit or is hiding in the private vaults  useless and unproductive afraid  of 
further  losses “ (1939, 475). 
The most striking features of the system evolution in the period 1929-39 are 
described by the indicators in Table 1: 
- The ratio of cash reserves relatively to current accounts decreases 58% to an 
average value of 76%; 
-The ratio of cash reserves relatively to all deposits is slowly decreasing with an 
average value of 29%; 
- The ratio saving accounts / current accounts has also a negative growth in the 
period while keeping a positive average value of 1.55; 
Table  1.Statistics of Monetary Stock ratios 
  CR/CA SA/CA CR/(CA+SA) 
Average Value 1910-1928 2.32 10.98 0.30 
 1929-1939 0.76 1.55 0.29 
 1940-1945 0.57 0.64 0.35 
Growth Rate 1910-1928 -0.67 -0.97 7.41 
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 1929-1939 -0.58 -0.55 -0.31 
 1940-1945 0.26 -0.05 0.29 
Note: CR/CA: Cash Reserves/Current account; CA/SA: Current account/Saving 
Account; CR/ (CA+SA): Cash Reserves/ (Current account +Saving account) 
 
 
The effects of the crisis are aggravated by the lack of assistance from Caixa 
Geral de Depósitos, which in the words of another congressman to the 1st Azorean 
Congress only gathers deposits and makes transfers without any further financial 
assistance. Banco de Portugal nominates administrators and promotes general 
assemblies of creditors in the 1934-35 period supporting the reconstitution and 
reorganization of local banks. Neither of these institutions provides liquidly to the 
system as lenders of last resort and there is no deposit insurance scheme operating at the 
time. 
In the third period, 1940-45, there is an increase in liquidity in the banking 
system from 43 million escudos in 1940 to 67 million escudos in 1944. The last year in 
the data set, 1945, is abnormal due to the acquisition of Caixa de Crédito Micaelense by 
Banco Espírito Santo e Comercial de Lisboa. Cash and near cash duplicates from 10 
million to 24 million escudos and there is a strong growth in current account values to 
43 million escudos. At the end of the period however the sum of current and saving 
account values, at 63 million escudos, are slightly below the 1929 values. The market 
and the bank system is still fragile as the 1943 annual report from Caixa de Crédito 
Micaelense  states,  referring to the small number of lending and borrowing operations 
in the local market “ so reduced that it is not enough to guaranty the viability of the 
surviving banks”. This evaluation induces the shareholders to open negotiations that 
lead to its sale to Banco Espírito Santo e Comercial de Lisboa. This acquisition marks 
the end of the attempt to build up a regional banking system with Azorean capital that 
began early in the XX century with the creation of Caixas Económicas.  
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Two main factors contribute to this prolonged crisis of the Azorean bank system 
according to 1st Congresso Açoriano: «the unfortunate policy of rapid and excessive 
appreciation of the escudo, was the main contributing factor in the islands, as it 
originates a rapid devaluation of property values with to a third of its previous value, 
when most of it was a guaranty to private loans with very high interest rates reaching 
20% ».  The effects of the crisis are stated with clarity by Furtado Leite, the rapporteur 
of the Trade and Industry session at 1st Congresso Açoriano: 
 “The tremendous crisis that plagues us (....), a crisis of work, lack of purchasing 
power of the [working class], increasingly immobilization  of fearful capital, excessive 
interest charged, a string of bankruptcies of weaker firms affect the loss of confidence “. 
 The solutions are identified as well:  “increase the liquidity in the economy 
supporting lending at zero interest rate to trade, industry, and agriculture supported by a 
valuation of agriculture property at higher values. The government should increase the 
supply of money based on the guaranty of property or by the emission of public debt. 
(1939, 459-461)”21. 
 
Conclusion 
The factors contributing to the deep and long crisis in the Azores are multiple. 
First of all the effects of the international crisis affect an economy dependent on the 
agro-export business which has as main markets the United Kingdom and Germany.  
Then the end of emigration to Brazil and the United States limit the outflow of the 
excess of labor and decrease emigrant remittances. 
  National factors add to the international factors, the 25% devaluation of escudo 
insulano and national monetary integration, the lack of capacity of national banks, 
Banco de Portugal and Caixa Geral de Depósitos, to provide additional liquidity and act 
19 
 
as lenders of last resort. The data analysis has produced as main conclusion a 29% 
contraction of liquidity and a 53% reduction of savings deposits which are associated 
with an overall reduction in monetary circulation in the 1929-1939 period.  
 At the local level the main factor was the 2/3 devaluation of property, according 
to Furtado Leite in 1st Congresso Açoriano, and the immobilization of capital locked in 
these investments which contributed to prolong the effects of the crisis till the end of the 
Second World War. 
The evidence supports the assertion that the initial external shock of trade 
reduction and falling external prices was amplified by domestic monetary factors and 
insufficient support by the central bank and Caixa Geral de Depósitos. 
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Figure 1. Evolution of cash reserves 
 
 
 
 Source: Authors´ calculations from annual reports data. 
 Note: Mandatory cash reserve determined by law; 
 
Figure 2. Evolution of liquid assets 
Source: Authors´ calculations from annual reports data.  
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Figure 3. Total current and savings accounts, Azores, 1910-1944 
 
 
 
 Source: Authors´ calculations from annual reports data. 
 
 
Figure 4. Evolution of ratio influencing monetary stock 
 
 Source: Authors´ calculations from annual report data. 
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